Secret\u27s Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current Trade Secret Law Structure and Protection for Global Health by Zimmerman, Stephanie
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 29
Number 4 Penn State International Law Review Article 4
12-1-2011
Secret's Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current Trade
Secret Law Structure and Protection for Global
Health
Stephanie Zimmerman
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zimmerman, Stephanie (2011) "Secret's Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current Trade Secret Law Structure and Protection for Global
Health," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 29: No. 4, Article 4.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol29/iss4/4
Comments
Secret's Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current
Trade Secret Law Structure and Protection
for Global Health
Stephanie Zimmerman*
I. INTRODUCTION: WH-Y ONE SET OF STANDARDS IS NOT WORKING
Trade-secret theft may be "the greatest threat to United States
economic competiveness in the global marketplace."' By the year 2000,
United States companies reported losing over $1 trillion from
intellectual-property theft, and that number is growing by an estimated
$250 billion each year.2  Additionally, intellectual property often
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1. See George Dilworth, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: An Overview,
http://www.cybercrime.gov/usamay200l_6.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
Dilworth] (Assistant U.S. Attorney quoting the Computer Security Institute).
2. See Joseph W. Cormier, Richard Kozell & Jessica L. McCurdy, Intellectual
Property Crimes; Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey of White Collar Crime, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 761, 763 (2009) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
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represents an enterprise's most valuable asset.3 The rapid growth of the
field4 and international policies towards intellectual property over the last
two decades underscore its value.5  Despite international efforts to
establish an intellectual-property framework, countries are left to their
own devices to enforce the purported international minimum standards.
Since various countries' intellectual-property laws have developed
independently of one another, the push for homogenization of
intellectual-property protection and enforcement throughout the world
presents difficulties.7 Through attempts at streamlining international law
on intellectual property, countries are forced to assess their domestic
treatment of private intellectual-property rights and whether they are in
fact meeting international standards.9 However, individual countries'
laws are a product of the values emphasized in the country. The
assumption that countries will alter years of jurisprudence to enforce a
legal structure that is not necessarily reflective of their values and
understanding of the law is a difficult assumption to make.
A comparison of trade-secret laws across different countries is
intriguing, since trade-secret law development is relatively new in most
countries, though the concept itself is very old.10 Trade secrets are an
extremely valuable form of intellectual property." The power of a trade
secret is its potential immortality.12 However, trade secrets have severe
limitations as well.13  Once the information is misappropriated, it is
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29 (2006), available
at http://www.cybercrime.gov/20061PTFProgressReport(6-19-06).pdf [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE].
3. See ALEXANDER POLTORAK & PAUL LERNER, ESSENTIALS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY xiiii (2002).
4. See DEBORAH E. BOUCHOUX, PROTECTING YOUR COMPANY'S INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADE
SECRETS viii (2001).
5. See CARSTEN FINK & KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1 (2005).
6. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (2003).
7. Id at 122.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secrets Assets: Critical
Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 656, 662 (2008). See also Karl F. Jorda, From the Editor: Federalizing Trade Secret
Law: A Cause Whose Time Has Come, GERMESHAUSEN CENTER NEWSL. (Franklin Piece
L. Center, Concord, N.H.), Summer-Fall 2008, at I1.
I1. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing that while trade secrets
have their limitations, they still represent highly valuable corporate assets and "are not to
be taken lightly").
12. Id. at 39.
13. Id. at 41.
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generally lost for good, and the developing entity no longer has a
recognized property interest in it.14  This juxtaposition calls for the
careful protection of trade secrets and a clear understanding of the
parameters of such protection.
Even the United States, considered a leader in intellectual-property
protection,' 5 has been critiqued by intellectual-property scholars for its
lack of comprehensive, effective protection for trade secrets.' 6 Still, the
United States was instrumental in international structuring of minimum
standards for intellectual property,'7 including trade secrets, and other
nations have formatted their trade-secret laws to those of the United
States.' 8 Yet today new models are gaining attention that may challenge
the dominant United States framework.' 9
This Comment recognizes the importance of international candor
surrounding the protection of valuable medical data through trade-secret
laws. After presenting the problem of international trade-secret
protection in Part I,20 Part 121 introduces the relationship between health
and intellectual property and the position that the global community has
taken towards trade secrets.
This Comment continues in Part 11122 with a discussion of United
States culture and history of trade-secret-law development. While the
United States has a strong history of intellectual-property rights
recognition, the United States is without a federal cause of action for
trade-secret misappropriation.23 The United States has been slow to
confront the problem of trade-secret misappropriation and has been
ineffective in protecting their trade secrets internationally. 24
Part IV 25 discusses and compares Chinese culture and trade-secret
law development. China has recently tried to show the international
26community that it is sincere about protecting intellectual property.
However, China's newly enacted laws are questionably effective.27
14. Id.
15. See SELL, supra note 6, at 60-61, 1-2.
16. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
17. See SELL, supra note 6, at 1-2.
18. Id.
19. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil's IP Opportunism Threatens US. Private
Property Rights, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (2006).
20. See supra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.A.-B.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.-C.
27. See infra Part IV.D.
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Part V2 8 of this Comment briefly discusses the cultural environment
of Brazil and the laws that protect trade secrets. This Comment then
introduces a new open access framework, encouraged by Brazil, and
discusses its impact on the global community.29
Part V13 o applies the lessons of the different countries' treatment of
trade secret on the medical industry. Part V131 then discusses the failings
of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS") 32 to find a proper connection between free trade and
international standards and presents the case for candor between
countries.33  This Comment concludes by revisiting the problems
inherent in the current system and where international protection of trade
secrets should go from here. 3 4
II. BACKGROUND: HEALTH, TRADE SECRETS AND TRIPS
A. Setting the Stage: Why Intellectual Property Is Important for
Health
It is no secret that the United States is facing a healthcare crisis that
challenges the very stability of the nation.35 This is largely due to the
expense of the United States healthcare system3 6 combined with the even
greater economic crisis in the United States.37 The expense of the United
States healthcare system can be attributed to many causes, two of which
include technological innovation and the costs of medicines and
28. See infra Part V.A.-B.
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. See infra Part VI.A.
31. See infra Part VI.B.
32. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 157-58 (2006) for a discussion on the evolution of the
TRIPS agreement.
33. See infra Part VI.B.
34. See infra Part VII.
35. See President Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Address
on Healthcare to the Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/remarks-by-the-president-to-a-joint-session-
of-congress-on-health-care/ [hereinafter President Barack Obama].
36. See American Values Blamed for U.S. Health Care Crisis, Science Daily Article
(Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/
081204160558.htm. "The United States boasts the world's most expensive health care
system, yet only one-sixth of Americans are insured. Medical expenditures exceed $2
trillion annually, making health care the economy's largest sector, four times bigger than
national defense. By 2015, the U.S. government is projected to spend $4 trillion on
health care, or 20 percent of the nation's gross domestic product." Id.
37. See President Barack Obama, supra note 35 (calling the economic downturn "the
worst economic crisis since the great depression").
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research. 3 8 Politicians in the United States are confronted with quite a
challenge as they seek to drive down the costs of healthcare, while
simultaneously trying to extend quality access to all citizens.39
This interplay between cost, quality, and access is at the heart of any
healthcare debate.40 Some developing countries claim that access to
current science and technology, which they lack, at concession-rate
prices is necessary to promote international peace and stability. 4 1 Access
to such information is often determined by the mechanisms in place to
protect valuable intellectual property, such as medical processes,
42technology, consumer data, and research and development. While
"developed" 3 countries, such as the United States, seek to find the
balance between affordability, quality and access, they also must contend
with the implications of their position for the international market.44 The
direction the United States will take will involve a consideration of their
expectations of other countries in the international market with respect to
treatment and protection of intellectual property. 4 5  Accordingly,
"developing'" countries47 must define for themselves what type of
intellectual-property scheme they wish to implement and enforce,
38. See Alex Lickeman M.D., A Prescription for the Health Care Crisis: The Real
Cause of Skyrocketing Heath Care Costs, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 20, 2009, available
at http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/happiness-in-world/200912/prescription-the-
health-care-crisis. Tables I and 2 show that pharmaceutical costs are 10% of total
healthcare costs and that technological innovation is one of the two main factors driving
costs. Id.
39. See President Barack Obama, supra note 35.
40. See Lickeman, supra note 38.
41. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 9-10. Brazil is leading the push for the doctrine of
sustainable development, which will "enable developing counties to liberate themselves
from endemic poverty and disease, so that they may ultimately achieve economic and
social parity with the developed world." Id.
42. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals
in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 445 (2004).
43. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devele/
dlwho e.htm (for a discussion on standing as a developed country).
44. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 9-10.
45. See Robert Graham Gibbons & Bryan J. Vogel, The Increasing Importance of
Trade Secret Protection in the Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Fields, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 261, 263 (2007).
46. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devel e/
dlwho e.htm (for a discussion on standing as a developing country).
47. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 7. "Furthermore Brazil has opportunistically
defined itself, for these and other purposes, as a developing country." Id. See also Allan
Segal, Comment, TRIPS: With a Painful Birth, Uncertain Health, and a Host of Issues in
China, Where Lies Its Future? 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 523, 538 (2006) (stating that China
designates itself as a developing nation, an unpopular move in the international
community).
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considering both quality and access to medicines, and their expectations
of the international community.48
B. Position of the International Community Towards Trade Secrets
There are multiple forms of intellectual property that impact the
medical industry and the corresponding protections that are available.49
Among the intellectual property necessary to the medical industry are
patents and licenses.o However, there is another form of intellectual
property used in virtually every industry and only gaining in importance
as the world becomes ever more integrated and globalized: trade
secrets.
Trade secrets can be defined differently where codified by different
countries, but some features are general to all conceptions of trade
secrets.52 For example, all trade secrets can be defined as information
that is reasonably secret, 53 and information that provides some advantage
to the individual who possesses it.s4 The types of information
protectable through trade-secret law are: a process, formula, device, or
any business secret that the holder has made reasonable efforts to
protect.55  The most popular example for what is protected by trade
secrets is the formula for Coca-Cola.56 Trade secret protection is
growing in popularity because, unlike other forms of intellectual
property, no application for protection is required, thus the secret
information can in fact stay a secret. 7 In addition, any protection or
remedies for misappropriation do not expire at some statutorily defined
point.58  This infinite property interest can be an incredibly appealing
48. See Gibbons & Vogel, supra note 45, at 263.
49. Id
50. See generally Fellmeth, supra note 42, at 443-44.
51. Id. at 445. See also Gibbons & Vogel, supra note 45, at 262.
52. See BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 194.
53. Not known to the general public and subject to reasonable efforts at secrecy. Id.
54. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 3, at 37.
55. Id.
56. See BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 195. The classic example is
[tihe recipe for Coca-Cola, which is rumored to be placed under lock and
key, with no one person having access. If the recipe or process for making
the beverage had been patented, its owner would have enjoyed exclusive
rights for only a limited time, after which the recipe or process would enter
the public domain. In contrast, maintaining the recipe and process as trade
secrets results in protection in perpetuity, as long as reasonable efforts are
made to safeguard the confidentiality of the information.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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feature for companies who want to prevent their work product from
entering the free market at some later date.59
With the increasing business and production conducted overseas,
businesses rely on trade secret law to protect their companies' most
valuable assets.o Still, the specific trade secret protection offered by
each country can vary internationally or even across states, as is the case
in the United States.61 In an effort to provide consistency in protection,
and expectations of protection, the global community has endeavored to
create uniform standards.62 The TRIPS agreement is the most
comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.6 Article
39.2 of TRIPS requires that "undisclosed information,"" trade secrets or
"know-how," benefit from protection.6 5  The aim of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), the implementing body of TRIPS, is to narrow
the gaps between the way intellectual property rights are protected
around the world, bringing them under common international rules.66
59. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 3, at 39.
60. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 657-658.
61. Id. at 662.
62. See SELL, supra note 6, at 121. See also World Trade Organization Overview:
the TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2 e.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. "Standards: In respect to each of
the main areas of intellectual property to be covered by the TRIPS Agreement, the
Agreement sets out the minimum standards of protection to be provided by each
Member." Id
63. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 62.
64. Id.
According to Article 39.2, the protection must apply to information that is
secret, that has commercial value because it is secret and that has been
subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret. The Agreement does not require
undisclosed information to be treated as a form of property, but it does
require that a person lawfully in control of such information must have the
possibility of preventing it from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by
others without his or her consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial
practices.
Id.
65. Id. The agreement also protects pharmaceutical marketing data. Id.
66. See World Trade Organization Intellectual Property: Protection and
Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/whatis-e/tif e/agrm7 e.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter IP: Protection and Enforcement].
It establishes minimum levels of protection that each government has to give
to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members. In doing so, it strikes a
balance between the long term benefits and possible short term costs to
society. Society benefits in the long term when intellectual property
protection encourages creation and invention, especially when the period of
protection expires and the creations and inventions enter the public domain.
Governments are allowed to reduce any short term costs through various
exceptions, for example to tackle public health problems. And, when there
are trade disputes over intellectual property rights, the WTO's dispute
settlement system is now available.
Id.
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While the intent behind the WTO and TRIPS is to create
homogeneity across the world, this method of facilitating trade and
increasing protection and competition creates problems.6 7 A "one size
fits all" approach does not work without consistent domestic
enforcement. 8 This approach requires signatory nations to not only
enforce TRIPS standards but also to maintain and enforce their own trade
secret law structure. 69 Enforcing a trade secret law structure is difficult
for those countries lacking a clear, uniform trade secret law or the
political or judicial body to do so. 70 Additionally, the TRIPS approach
forces less influential countries 7 1 with different goals and legal structures
to adopt the dominant model created by the countries with the most
influence. 7 2 Consequently, the less influential countries feel backed into
a corner. 7 3 These countries must choose between adhering to less-than-
optimal policies and placing themselves in a disadvantaged position in
relation to a majority of the international community.74 The tension
between what counties agree to and what they will actually support
domestically" creates a major problem for trade-secret security.
By studying the foundations of different countries the international
community can assess which policies the different countries will support
and enforce. On the surface, the disparity between United States, China,
and Brazil trade-secret laws is minimal. However, the cultural
differences between the United States, China, and Brazil have a direct
impact on their treatment and enforcement of intellectual-property
rights. These differences create questions as to the feasibility of TRIPS
and the aims it purports to serve.
67. See SELL, supra note 6, at 121-122.
68. Id. at 121.
69. Id.
70. See Arewa, supra note 32, at 163.
71. Id. at 158-159 for a discussion on how international trade accords are negotiated
and implemented in a world of "power asymmetries and webs of history and culture that
often condition the assumptions and relationships of participants in such negotiations."
Also, "relative competitive, including scientific, technological, and institutional capacity,
can play an important role in determining the beneficiaries of a particular global
intellectual property framework or bilateral or regional agreements within such a
framework."
Id.
72. See SELL, supra note 6, at 1.
73. See Arewa, supra note 32, at 158-159.
74. Most Countries are already TRIPS signatories and enjoy the trade benefits that
follow from membership. Id.
75. Id.
76. See SELL, supra note 6, at 121.
[Vol. 29:4784
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III. TRADE SECRET LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Development of United States Trade Secret Law and
Culture
United States trade-secret protection is an evolving phenomenon.77
Trade secrets have historically been treated differently than other forms
of intellectual property in the United States.78 This treatment is largely a
result of the kaleidoscope of legal theories from which trade-secret
protection arises, such as contract, property, fiduciary relationship, and
unjust enrichment. 79  And while the protection of confidential
information dates back to Roman times,so a trade-secret asset was not
recognized in the United States as a constitutionally protected property
right until 1984.81 This delayed conceptualization of a trade secret as
property has likely led to its rapid increase in popularity over the last
couple decades.8 2
The relationship between the United States and intellectual property
generally, and trade-secret law specifically, can be grounded in United
States cultural aims and values. American culture starts from the
proposition that distinctive sections and geographic areas may be
inherently different, yet a dominating "spirit" unifies all Americans.
This "spirit" can be described as "scientific effectiveness," which stands
as the basis for United States productivity and force as a nation.84
American hopes and dreams center around increasing living standards
and continually growing "bigger and better."85  Americans tend to
operate as a more competitive, individual basis than as a collective
77. See generally Halligan, supra note 10, at 663-64.
78. Id. at 661 (referring to the reasons for the "step-child" treatment of trade secrets
as historical).
79. See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU
Approach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207,213-14 (2008).
80. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 662. See also Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
81. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 661-62. "Patents and trademarks are the by-
products of the Industrial Revolution. Copyrights date back to the invention of the
printing press, if not earlier. Trade secrets were viewed at various times as unfair
competition or quasi-contract rights with different labels attached to such rights in law
and equity." Id. See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding
that trade secrets are a property right recognized by the United States Constitution) cited
in Halligan, supra note 10, at 662.
82. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
83. See UNESCO, INTERRELATIONS OF CULTURES: THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 235 (1971) (proposing that this "dominating spirit" be
called "scientific effectiveness") [hereinafter UNESCO].
84. Id. at 235.
85. Id. at 236.
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basis. 86 Finally, Americans are driven by the "American dream": the
ingrained feeling and belief that everyone has potential to succeed.87
Such tenets of American culture have influenced United States
formulation of trade-secret law. Examples of such influence are the ease
and duration of protection,8 8 the new and developing nature of the law,89
and the inherent policy of encouraging innovation and competition.90
Trade-secret protection can offer a comparatively quick, easy, and cheap
way to protect property that might otherwise be protected through more
formal conceptions of intellectual property such as patent law.91 There
are no government formalities and no time limits on protection of the
intellectual property, contrary to patents and copyrights. 92 Additionally,
if a company or individual submits a "secret" for patent approval and is
denied, the secret will be lost and in the hands of their competitors.93
Unfortunately, due to the relative newness of trade-secret laws, there
remain issues of standardization and enforcement. 94 Still, the desire to be
competitive at home and abroad fuels the growing utilization of trade-
secret protections today.95
B. United States Trade-Secret Laws and Regulation
Evidence of the developing nature of the law is reflected in the lack
of uniformity of trade-secret protection in the United States.9 6 While the
United States Supreme Court has recognized trade secrets as property,
the misappropriation of trade secrets remains unregulated by federal
law. 9 7 Although a criminal cause of action for misappropriation of trade
secrets exists under the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), there is no
federal civil cause of action.98  Instead, trade secrets are regulated by
varying state laws as each state is free to enact its own statutes governing
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See A.B.A. PRIVACY & COMPUTER CRIME COMMITTEE, SEC. OF SCI. & TECH. L.,
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 59 (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004) (describing the UTSA,
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
promulgated in 1979) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY].
89. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 662. See also Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
90. Id.
91. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 59.
92. See BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 193.
93. See Michael C. Budden, Robert C. Lake & John W. Yeargain, Strategic
Planning for Protection of Business Secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 7 J.
MANAGERIAL ISSUES (1995).
94. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 662. See also Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
95. See FINK & MASKUS, supra note 5, at 19, 42.
96. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 662. See also Jorda, supra note 10, at I1.
97. See BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 194.
98. Id. See also Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
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trade secrets.99 While most states have adopted some form of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"),'oo there remains "glaring holes
and discrepancies."' 0' As a result, there are inconsistent regulations for
trade secrets, which has led some intellectual property scholars in the
United States to call for an overarching federal law to regulate trade
secrets and create a federal civil cause of action.' 0 2
1. Civil Cause of Action under the UTSA
Thus, states must rely on their own statutory and common law,
misappropriation claims, unfair-competition claims and state contractual
claims for protection of trade secrets.'0 3 Many state statutes borrow their
law from the UTSA, which has a two-part definition of "trade secret." 0 4
Under the UTSA, trade secret is generally defined as "information,
including a formula, pattern compilation, program, device, method,
technique or process" that derives "independent economic value"s05 from
"not being known or discoverable by others," and is "the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy."',
06
Individual courts will usually draw from a list of factors to
determine whether something is a trade secret and whether efforts at
protecting that secret were in fact "reasonable."',0 7 Examples of such
factors include the extent to which the information is known outside the
owner's business, the extent of measures taken to keep the information
secret, the value of the information, the relative time and money
expended by the owner in developing the information, and the relative
ease or difficulty for another to acquire the information.'0o In addition,
the secrecy requirement is not absolute; rather the "reasonable" effort
99. See BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 194.
100. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 59. See also
BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at 194 (stating that the NCCUSL envisioned that each state
would adopt the act).
101. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 670.
102. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 11. See also Halligan, supra note 10, at 656-57
(discussing the need for a federal civil cause of action that streamlines enforcement of
trade-secret misappropriation).
103. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 59.
104. Id. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (Drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, as amended 1985).
105. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). See also BOUCHOUX, supra note 4, at
193 (describing the economic value as actual or potential).
106. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 59. UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
107. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 60-61.
108. Id.
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inquiry creates a sliding scale for the court to balance the value of the
information against the measure taken to protect it.'0 9
2. Misappropriation and Remedies under the UTSA
Once the analysis for "trade secret" is complete, courts turn to
misappropriation." 0 The UTSA outlines two forms of misappropriation:
acts through "improper means" and acts in violation of a valid
nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement."' If the court finds that a
trade secret has been misappropriated, it will award remedies.l12
Civil remedies usually consist of three types: injunction, monetary
damages, and attorney's fees." 3 The UTSA provides injunctive relief for
actual or threatened misappropriation of information that can be viewed
as a trade secret.1 14  A court may additionally award two types of
monetary damages: compensatory and exemplary. 5  Compensatory
damages are awarded for an actual loss or unjust enrichment resulting
from misappropriation."16  However, if a court feels that the
misappropriation was willful and malicious, the court can award
exemplary damages up to twice the amount of actual or compensatory
damages. H7
3. Framework and Enforcement under the EEA
The EEA is a federal criminal act regulating the misappropriation of
trade secrets."' 8 The EEA was passed in 1996 and is composed of two
sections, Section 1831"9 and Section 1832.120 Section 1831 regulates
economic espionage committed by foreign governments, foreign
instrumentalities, and foreign agents.121 Section 1832 regulates trade-
secret theft that benefits anyone other than the true owner.122 Both
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id.at60-61.
11l. Id. at 61 (noting that the UTSA defines "improper means" as "theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means").
112. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 61.
113. Id. See also Budden, Lake & Yeargain, supra note 93.
114. See Budden, Lake & Yeargain, supra note 93.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (1996).
119. Id. § 1831.
120. Id. § 1832.
121. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 664.
122. Id.
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Sections have an "intent component," requiring that the misappropriation
have been "knowingly" committed.123
The definition of "trade secret" is broader under the EEA than it is
under the UTSA and state civil statutes.124 Trade secret protects "all
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, whether or how stored, complied, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in
writing." 25
The two-part requirement for information to be considered a trade
secret under the EEA is similar to that under the UTSA: the owner has
taken "reasonable measures" to keep the information secret 26 and the
information derives "independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being ascertainable through
proper means by, the public."' 2 7
Section 1831, "economic espionage," covers more than outright
theft by a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.' 28 This section
can also be used to prosecute trafficking in stolen trade secrets and the
attempt and any conspiracy to commit such offenses.129  Section 1831
imposes more severe penalties' 3 0 than Section 1832, reflecting Congress'
belief that foreign agents pose the greatest risk to American
businesses. 131
Section 1832, "theft of trade secrets" for economic or commercial
advantage, applies to a broader range of activities and offenders but
contains prosecutorial limitations not present in Section 1831.132 Under
Section 1832, (i) the intended benefit realized must be economic in
nature, (ii) the thief must intend of know that the offense will injure the
rightful owner, and (iii) the stolen information must be "related to or
included in a product produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
123. See Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note 2, at 763.
124. See Dilworth, supra note 1. See United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
2000) ("the Act defines 'trade secret' broadly, to include both tangible property and
intangible information").
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (1996).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. § 1831 (a)(1-5). See also Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note 2, at 767.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1-5) (1996). See also Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra
note 2, at 767.
130. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996) ("fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned
not more than 15 years or both") with 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (1996) ("fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both").
131. See Dilworth, supra note 1.
132. See Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note 2, at 767.
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commerce." 33  Section 1831 offers a greater range of remedies,
reflecting Congress' heightened concern with respect to foreign actors;
still prosecutions under the EEA have occurred largely under Section
1832, even though Section 1832 imposes a tougher prosecutorial
burden. 3 4
An advantageous feature inherent in federal legislation is the access
to the federal court system. Federal courts provide for national service of
process.'3 5 National service of process can be particularly important in
trade-secret cases where evidence and witnesses are scattered across the
country.136 The location of evidence and witnesses can present a major
difficulty in pursuing trade-secret misappropriation under state statutes
because trade secrets are inherently time sensitive.137  Additionally,
criminal sanctions are likely to be a much stronger deterrent than civil
sanctions. Some intellectual-property "thieves" view civil sanctions as
merely "the cost of doing business."' 3 9 Federal statutes, other than the
EEA, used by prosecutors to combat the misappropriation of trade
secrets have been largely unsuccessful.140
C. Consequences for the United States Globally
Grappling with disparity in the law among the varying states and the
federal government can be viewed as a microcosm for the U.S.
experience when working with and within foreign countries. In fact,
unifying the legal structure for trade-secret law in the United States
would likely strengthen the United States' ability to compete in the
international market.141 Furthermore, the lack of uniformity could be
viewed as a failure to comply with both the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") and TRIPS, 14 since both international
instruments mandate national standards for trade-secret protection within
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996). See also Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note
2, at 812 n.40 (noting that this requirement is broader than the UTSA's corresponding
provision that requires that the person misappropriating the trade secret be the one
benefiting from its disclosure or use).
134. See Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note 2, at 768.
135. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 667.
136. Id. at 668.
137. Id.
138. See Cormier, Kozell & McCurdy, supra note 2, at 763 (discussing the
importance of Federal protection of intellectual-property rights given the current ease in
which illegitimate goods can be distributed).
139. Id
140. Id. at 765 (these include the National Stolen Property Act, the Trade Secrets Act,
the Mail and Wire Fraud statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act).
141. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 658.
142. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 13. See also Halligan, supra note 10, at 671.
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individual signatory countries.14 3 These realities present a particularly
large problem when considering that an estimated eighty to ninety
percent of all new technology could potentially be protectable through
trade-secret law.144 Additionally, the threat from trade-secret
misappropriation is not only economic.' 4 5 Beyond monetary damages,
intellectual-property theft can also be a serious threat to the health and
safety of the general public.14 6 For example, when counterfeit materials
are used in pharmaceuticals they can be incredibly harmful to consumers
who unknowingly ingest them.147
A survey conducted by the leading authoritative resourcel48 on
proprietary-information losses by United States companies confirmed
that sixty percent of respondents knew of attempted or actual trade-secret
theft occurring within their respective companies.' 4 9  Moreover, the
primary beneficiaries of the theft were foreign entities.'5 0 These statistics
are particularly relevant to a medical-services inquiry because
information vital to the medical industry not only includes scientific
formulae and processes but also research and development, and
consumer data, which are protected largely through trade secret.' 5'
These facts show that trade-secret policies espoused by the United States
are largely unsuccessful. While the United States has a strong history
and rhetoric of protecting private-property rights, current United States
policies are ineffective in combating the misappropriation of trade
secrets.
IV. TRADE SECRET LAW IN CHINA
While the United States is concerned with China's compliance on
piracy and counterfeiting issues,15 2 Chinese trade-secret law is facially
very similar to the United States laws; moreover, China has a nationwide
143. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 13.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id
147. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 13. See also Halligan, supra note 10, at 671.
148. The American Society for Industrial Security ("ASIS") International.
149. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 660 (citing ASIS INTERNATIONAL, TRENDS IN
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Loss 4 (2007), available at http://www.asisonline.org/
newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.).
150. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 660 (citing ASIS INTERNATIONAL, "China, Russia
and India were identified as the top intended non-U.S. recipients of compromised
information").
151. See Fellmeth, supra note 42, at 445. See also Gibbons & Vogel, supra note 45,
at 262.
152. See Segal, supra note 47, at 536.
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civil cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets. 153
However, enacting and enforcing such laws are not the same.154 There
are benefits for China internationally in developing intellectual-property
legislation that appears counter to Chinese culture and tradition.'
5 5
A. Historical Development of Chinese Trade-Secret Law and Culture
Intellectual-property recognition and rights are relatively new in
China.156 China first began developing intellectual-property laws in 1979
following reform.' 57  The first intellectual property-centered rights
dispute was in 1992.158 China has had intellectual-property law
structures in place since the 1980s,159 but training for intellectual-
property personnel has lagged behind.160 Additionally, China has been
comparatively slow to raise public awareness on the importance of
intellectual-property rights.' 6' This is likely due to China's roots in
153. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA, STATE COUNCIL OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY 2008 http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policy/documents/241260.shtml (describing
the copyright and patent law promulgation in 1979 and 1980 and proposal for growth and
development of the intellectual property law structure) [hereinafter CHINA INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STRATEGY].
154. See Segal, supra note 47, at 540.
155. Id
156. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 153,
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policy/documents/241260.shtml (describing the copyright
and patent law promulgation in 1979 and 1980 and proposal for growth and development
of the intellectual property law structure).
157. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 153 (with reform
came the "opening up" policy where China became open to trade with other countries).
See also CHINA, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 10219 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter CHINA].
158. In December 1993, Beijing Intermediate People's Court ordered 24 million yuan
for a breach of intellectual-property rights. World News, Wang Yongmin,
http://wn.com/WangYongmin.
159. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 153 (discussing the
creation of the China Patent Office in 1980 and the "Patent Law of the People's Republic
of China" in 1985 with corresponding related laws and regulations to follow). In 1979
China had unified registration of trademarks; the "Trade Mark Law" went into effect in
1983 accompanied by corresponding rules, regulations and revisions. See id. Copyright
Protection was established in the 1990s with the "Copyright Law" and the Law Against
Unfair Competition was adopted and promulgated in 1993. See id.
160. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 153 (stating that "the
intellectual property service and support system and training for all types of intellectual
property personnel lag behind its development").
161. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 153 (stating that "the
quality and quantity of the self-relied intellectual property still cannot meet the demands
of economic and social development"). "The public awareness of the importance of
intellectual property is comparatively weak and the capacity of market entities to utilize
intellectual property is not very strong." See id. "Infringement of intellectual property is
still a relatively serious problem." See id. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN CHINA, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE P.R.C., PROTECT YOUR
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Confucianism, a collectivist philosophy.16 2 Under Confucian ideology
there is minimal emphasis on the rights of original creators of goods.16 3
Moreover, copying in China has traditionally been viewed as
respectful.' Accordingly China's tradition and history are incongruous
with modern intellectual-property law. 65
China is a one-party state with power centralized under the Chinese
Communist party ("CCP").16 6 In the early 1980s, China reorganized the
structure of the government and the CCP.'67  This reorganization
rehabilitated parts of the nation purged during the Cultural Revolution
and emphasized "the maintenance of discipline, loyalty, and spiritual
purity in the face of increasing international contact." 6 8
A Chinese scholar reflects the Chinese approach to international
treatment of intellectual-property rights, stating that "[m]ore often you,
the United States, go from the specific to the general. You think if you[,]
[China,] do well on human rights, IPR [intellectual property rights], then
we'd be friends. Chinese are just the opposite; if we are friends we can
deal with specifics easier."' 6 9
China began building its current, modern legal structure in the late
1970s.170 At that time, China also began opening itself economically to
the rest of the world.' 7' Since then, China has developed legal codes in
the areas of criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial law.'7 2 Yet
the legal system is not independent of the government; a problem that is
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, HEIGHTENING THE PUBLIC AWARENESS 2007,
available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policy/IPR/251301.shtml. "The aim is to create
a social atmosphere in which labor, knowledge, talent and creation are respected, and
heighten the awareness of the general public regarding IPR." Id.
162. See Segal, supra note 47, at 539-40.
163. Id. at 540.
164. Id.
165. See generally id. at 539-40 for a discussion on China's legal culture and lack of
intellectual property tradition.
166. See CHINA, supra note 157, at 10219.
167. Id.
The country is governed under the constitution of 1982 as amended, the fifth
constitution since the accession of the Communists in 1949.
Administratively, the country is divided into 22 provinces, five autonomous
regions, and four municipalities. Despite the concentration of power in the
Communist party, the central government's control over the provinces and
local governments is limited, and they are often able to act with relative
impunity in many areas.
Id.
168. Id.
169. See DAVID M. LAMPTON, SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS: MANAGING U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS, 1989-2000 65 (2001) (quoting a Chinese scholar, June 20, 1998).
170. See CHINA, supra note 157, at 10219.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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"especially acute on the local level, where corrupt officials manipulate
the process to protect themselves and limit citizens' rights."'73
B. China's Trade-Secret Laws and Regulation
China's leaders have stated their desire to improve the national
understanding and treatment of intellectual property.' 74  Likewise,
China's leaders are padding a legal structure for the protection of trade
secrets, or as they refer to it generally, protection against "unfair
competition."' 7 5 The leading law, enacted in 1993, is the Law Against
Unfair Competition of the People's Republic of China ("Unfair
Competition Law"). 76
The Unfair Competition Law has been modified by different
regulations, such as Regulations on Prohibiting Anti-Competitive
Practices of Public Enterprises, 7 7 Regulations Prohibiting Infringement
of Commercial Secrets,178  Regulations on Prohibiting Unfair
Competition Activity Concerning Imitating Specific Names,17 9
Packaging or Decoration of Well-known Commodities, 80  and
Regulations on Prohibiting Unfair Competition in Prize-Attached
173. Id.
174. See CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, available at
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policy/documents/241260.shtml [hereinafter IP PROTECTION
IN CHINA].
175. See EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES BEIJING CHINA, IPR TOOLKIT, TRADE
SECRETS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ipr_tsuc.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter IPR TOOLKIT].
176. See IP PROTECTION IN CHINA, [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People's
Republic of China] (Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the
Eighth National People's Congress on September 2, 1993, promulgated by order No.10
of the President of the P.R.C. Sept. 2 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) STANDING COMM.
NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG.) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/laws/others/232713.shtml. See also Jeffrey J. Zuber,
Trade Secrets, Rules Regulation and Enforcement in China and the US-a Comparative
Analysis, CHINA INTELL. PROP. (ISSUE 21) (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/joumal-show.asp?id=394 [hereinafter Zuber]
(Jeffrey Zuber LLP services a wide range of clients throughout the world in intellectual
property disputes). See also IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
177. See IP PROTECTION IN CHINA, [Certain Regulations on Prohibiting Anti-
Competitive Practices of Public Enterprises] (adopted at the bureau affairs meeting of the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce Dec. 9 1992) ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUSTRY
AND COM. available at http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/laws/others/232696.shtml.
178. See IP PROTECTION IN CHINA, CERTAIN REGULATIONS ON PROHIBITING
INFRINGEMENT OF COMMERCIAL SECRETS, http://www.chinaipr.gov.cnlaws/laws/others/
232701.shtml.
179. See IP PROTECTION IN CHINA, CERTAIN REGULATIONS ON PROHIBITING UNFAIR
COMPETITION ACTivITY CONCERNING IMITATING SPECIFIC NAMES, PACKAGING OR
DECORATION OF WELL-KNow COMMODITIES, http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/laws/
others/232704.shtml.
180. See generally, IP PROTECTION IN CHINA, supra note 174.
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Sales.18  The regulations are further clarified by the "Interpretation of
the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application
of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition."' 8 2
China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce ("SAIC")
is the oversight body for intellectual-property protection.,8 Under the
SAIC, the Antimonopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement
Bureau is responsible for the implementation of the Unfair Competition
Law.184 The Local Administration for Industry and Commerce ("AIC")
is responsible for administrative enforcement of the law.'8 5
The Unfair Competition Law defines "business secrets" as
"technical information and operational information which is not known
to the public, which is capable of bringing economic benefits to the
owner of rights, which has practical applicability and which the owner of
rights has taken measures to keep secret."' 86 This definition of "business
secrets" is similar to the general understanding of what the United States
considers a trade secret. 87 However, the meaning of the terms within the
definition as interpreted by Chinese courts and scholars differ from the
meaning the terms have attained in the U.S. and may not be so
intuitive.8
1. "Not known to the public": The "public" in this definition does
not refer to the general public, but to current or prospective industry
competitors or people who want to obtain economic benefit by
exploiting the secret. The "public" is also limited to the Chinese
"public"-if a trade secret is known outside of China, but not inside
181. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION IN CHINA, LAWS AND TREATIES, http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/laws/
index.shtml.
182. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Zuber, supra note 176.
The Interpretation on the Application during the Trial of Civil Cases on
Unfair Competition, promulgated by the Supreme People's Court of PRC,
effective Feb. 1, 2007, lists the following circumstances that should be
excluded from the scope of "business secrets": general knowledge or known
practices for those working in the technical or economic lines; information
relating only to the product's size, structure, material, parts, etc. that the
public could easily ascertain by looking at it after it enters the market;
information that has been disclosed in publications or other media, or
demonstrated in public reports or exhibitions; information that can be
obtained by other public channels; information that can easily be obtained
without paying certain prices.
Id.
187. See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 88, at 59.
188. See Zuber, supra note 176.
2011] 795
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
China, it is considered "unknown to the public" under this definition.
"Unknown" means secret and not accessible through public channels.
2. "Potential economic benefits": Through tangible or intangible
means, the trade secret must be able to generate profit or commercial
value, or provide a competitive advantage.
3. "Practical applicability": The information should be specific and
immediately useful and applicable to industrial and business
applications. It cannot be mere theory or general principle.
4. "Measures to keep secret": Before an owner of a trade secret can
claim infringement, he must show that he took proper and reasonable
steps to keep the information secret, and he should be able to trace
those steps through written record.189
Article 10 of the Unfair Competition Law further defines
"infringement" once a business secret has been established:
1. obtaining business secrets from the owners of rights by stealing,
promising of gain, resorting to coercion or other improper means;
2. disclosing, using, or allowing others to use business secrets of the
owners of rights obtained by the means mentioned in the preceding
item;
3. disclosing, using or allowing others to use business secrets that he
has obtained by breaking an engagement or disregarding the
requirement of the owners of the rights to maintain business secrets
in confidence.190
Article 10 of the Unfair Competition Law also provides for third-
party liability.' 9' A third party is considered to have infringed the
business secrets of others where he "obtains, uses[,] or discloses the
business secrets of others when he obviously has or should have full
awareness of the illegal acts" discussed above.' 92
189. Id. (citing Judge Cheng Yongshun's book, A FURTHER STUDY OF TRADE
SECRET'S LEGAL FEATURES.)
190. See Zuber, supra note 176.
19 1. Id.
192. Id.
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C. Unfair Competition Law: Enforcement, Liability and Remedies
1. Administrative Enforcement and Remedies
Chapter III of the Unfair Competition Law, "Supervision and
Inspection," gives the AIC the power to investigate and enforce penalties
for acts of unfair competition.1 93 Possible penalties include confiscating
the illegal income, ordering the business operator to cease the illegal act,
imposing a fine, and revoking the business operator's business license.19 4
Additionally, under the business-secrets regulations, AICs have the
authority to instruct the return of drawings, blueprints, and other
materials containing business secrets; and to order the destruction of
goods manufactured using stolen business secrets if such goods would
disclose the secrets to the public if made available.195 The AIC can
impose a fine of between 10,000 Renminbi ("RMB") and 200,000
RMB.196 However, critics feel that these AIC fines are not large enough
to deter unfair competition.19 7 Furthermore, the AICs do not award
individual compensation in unfair-competition cases; injured parties
must instead turn to civil litigation.198
2. Civil Actions and Remedies
If the injured party feels that the administrative action was not
adequate or seeks compensation in the form of damages, then he or she
can appeal before a People's Court.' 99 However, the plaintiff has a high
burden of proof in an appeal before the People's Court. 20 0 First, the
plaintiff must prove that what he is seeking to protect does meet the
definition of trade secret as described above.20 1 Then the plaintiff must
prove that the other party unlawfully infringed plaintiffs business
202
secret. While judges are fair, they are unfortunately not obligated in
the People's Court to follow precedent, making the plaintiffs case more
difficult. 203
193. Id.
194. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
195. Id.
196. See Zuber, supra note 176.
197. Id.
198. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
199. See Zuber, supra note 176.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id
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In determining monetary damages, courts have followed the model
articles in the Unfair Competition Law.20 Where the offending party
causes damages through his actions, he shall be responsible for
compensating the injured party for those damages. 205 Where the losses to
the injured party are difficult to ascertain, courts will calculate damages
based on the infringer's increased profits as a result of the
206 adiin
misappropriation. In addition, the infringing party is responsible for
the fees involved in investigating the case.207 It can take an average of
four to seven years for a case to be heard, and it is rare for large damages
to be awarded.20 8
201Along with damages, an injured party can request an injunction.
Injunctions are the easiest method for a trade-secret owner to prevent
further infringement because owners only need to request a preliminary
injunction from the court.210
3. Criminal Penalties
Article 219 of China's Criminal Law, Crimes of Disrupting the
Order of the Socialist Market Economy, outlines criminal liability for a
party infringing the business secrets of another.2 1 1 Article 219's
description of infringement of a business secret is almost a mirror image
of Article 10 of The Law Against Unfair Competition.212
Article 219 further states that if a party commits any of three acts of
infringing on business secrets and, as a result, causes "heavy losses" to
the business secret owner, he or she can be sentenced to a prison term of
a maximum of three years in addition to being fined.2 13 Article 219 does
204. See Zuber, supra note 176.
205. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
206. Id
207. See Zuber, supra note 176.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Section 219 of The People's Republic of China Criminal Law, available at
http://www.unitalen.com/html/node/ 11278-1 .htm.
212. Id.
(1) Obtaining an obligee's business secrets by stealing, luring, coercion or
any other illegitimate means; (2) disclosing, using or allowing another to use
the business secrets obtained from the obligee by the means mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or (3) in violation of the agreement on or against the
obligee's demand for keeping business secrets, disclosing, using or allowing
another person to use the business secrets he has.
Id.
213. Id. See, e.g., Ningobo Oriental Movement Ltd v. Ningbo Yuanda Co Ltd and Li
Guoqi (1999) (Individual defendant found liable for infringement for stealing and using
the plaintiffs trade secret, causing plaintiff to suffer damages of more than RMB
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not define "heavy losses," however, in 2004, the Supreme People's Court
214
and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued a judicial interpretation.
Under the interpretation, "heavy losses" are defined as 500,000 RMB for
individuals and 1,500,000 RMB for an enterprise.215
Article 219 further states that if the consequences of infringement
are "especially serious," then the infringing party will be sentenced to no
less than three and no more than seven years in prison and will be forced
to pay a fine.2 16 Under the interpretation, "especially serious" is
incurring losses of 2,500,000 RMB for individuals and 7,500,000 RMB
for an enterprise.2 17
Additionally, Article 219 provides for third-party liability under the
Unfair Competition Law where an infringer knows or should have
known that the information in question falls under one of the three
categories of business secrets.2 18 There are likely more instances of
criminal infringement than what is reported because business-secret
owners fear that reporting to the authorities may expose the business
secret during criminal prosecution.2 19 Since one of the requirements for a
business secret is that it is not public knowledge, such exposure could
220
completely devalue the secret, and it explains owner hesitations.
D. Consequences for China Globally
Enforcement of business-secret rights following infringement is
more difficult in China than in the United States.221 These enforcement
difficulties require that companies in China take comprehensive,
preventative measures to protect their business secrets. 22 2 The same is
true for foreign companies operating in or together with China.223
1,000,000. The Ningbao Dongjiang People's Court sentenced the defendant to three
years in jail and a fine of RMB 200,000.). See also, Zuber, supra note 176.
214. See IPR TOOLKIT, supra note 175.
215. Id
216. Section 219 of The People's Republic of China Criminal Law, available at
http://www.unitalen.com/html/node/ 1278-1.htm.
217. See Zuber, supra note 176.
218. Section 219 of The People's Republic of China Criminal Law, available at
http://www.unitalen.com/html/node/1 1278-1.htm.
219. See Zuber, supra note 176.
220. Section 219 of The People's Republic of China Criminal Law, available at
http://www.unitalen.com/html/node/1 1278-1.htm. See also, Zuber, supra note 176.
221. See Zuber, supra note 176.
222. See id. (these measures include: (1)Trade Secret Audit: If development and
protection of trade secrets is a dynamic process in your company, it's advisable to
implement a regular method by which you screen your trade secret program, identify all
potential trade secret information and ensure its current protection; (2) Restricted access
areas, passwords and clearance levels for all users of the secret information; (3)
Encrypting and physically securing of sensitive materials; (4) Enabling users of secret
information to gain access to only the necessary part of the information, whenever
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Similar to the United States, China has adopted methods through
contract law for prevention of infringement of business secrets.224
Methods adopted by China include Employee Confidentiality
Agreements and Agreements Not to Compete. 22 5  Employee
Confidentiality Agreements are codified in Article 102 of the Labour
Law of the People's Republic of China, which states that when an
employee "breaches a confidentiality agreement provided in the
employment contract, causing economic damages to the employer, he or
she is responsible for compensating the damages according to the
law."226  Current and former employees normally must keep the
information confidential until it becomes generally known to the public
by other means.227 Agreements Not to Compete are not codified in
Chinese law, but Chinese courts have recognized and upheld such
agreements as long as they contain certain provisions. 2 8  With both
forms of preventative measures, the more specific the contracts are
regarding the business secret to be covered, the more effective they
usually are. 22 9
When China's leaders decided to trade within the international
community, China desired to become a contracting party to the WTO and
enjoy the benefits of such membership. 230 Thereafter, in December
2001, China became a party to the WTO.23 1
possible; (5) Classification methods, including something as simple as the use of stamps
on materials identifying them as "SECRET," "CONFIDENTIAL," etc.; (6) Written
confidentiality and non-compete agreements with everyone who will have any contact
with trade secrets; (7) Employee identification IDs and visitor clearance requirements (8)
Employee handbooks with provisions regarding trade secrets, photocopying policies, etc.
(9) Reference and background checks on all managers, key employees and persons who
will have regular access to any secret information (10) Performing exit interviews with
departing employees and providing a reminder of their continuing confidentiality
obligations.).
223. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 660 n.57 (citing ASIS INTERNATIONAL, "China,
Russia and India were identified as the top intended non-U.S. recipients of compromised
information").
224. See Zuber, supra note 176.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id
228. Id. (1) Specific scope of the non-compete limitation; (2) Term-must be fair and
reasonable. Local regulations dictate a maximum length, typically a maximum of three
years; (3) The Amount of Compensation-a non-compete is invalid in China unless the
employer provides necessary economic compensation to the employee who is obligated
not to compete during the non-compete period. Regulations provide that the minimum
annual compensation for non-compete obligations is half of the employee's annual total
income the employee received the year before he or she left; (4) Method of payment of
the compensation; (5) Liabilities for breach of the agreement. Id.
229. See Zuber, supra note 176.
230. See Segal, supra note 47, at 538.
231. Id.
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Once China signed the WTO agreement it also had to sign TRIPS,
because of the all-encompassing aims of the WTO.232 As previously
discussed, TRIPS mandates trade-secrets legislation within signatory
states.233 Yet when China signed to the WTO and TRIPS in 2001, it took
advantage of WTO regulations that allows a signatory nation to designate
itself as a developing nation. 23 4 As a result, China could take more time
to implement the required changes within the country so that they were
in compliance with TRIPS.235 While completely legal, the move was not
well received in the international community, since the purpose behind
signing on was presumably to bring China up to international standards
rather than simply buy time for compliance.2 36
In recent years, commerce between China and the rest of the world
has increased dramatically. 2 37 And while China has shown support for
intellectual-property regulation, there remains doubt about China's
resolve to adopt international intellectual-property standards.2 38
V. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: BRAZIL AND OPEN SOURCE
While the United States represents the dominant model 23 9 on
intellectual-property law and China openly appears to be following
suit,240 Brazil, once also a follower, 2 4 1 has recently presented an
alternative path.2 4 2 Brazil now proposes an "open source model" 24 3 that
has gained attention from the international community. 244  This new
model could be viewed as a threat to the United States, 245 but given the
history and development of Brazil it may present a better future for her
country.
232. Id.
233. Id. See also, Jorda, supra note 10, at 13 and Halligan, supra note 10, at 671.
234. See Segal, supra note 47, at 538.
235. Id. at 538-39.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 536.
238. Id. "Several recent high profile patent court decisions, as well as the virtually
unabated piracy of copyrighted materials, have raised doubts about the resolve of the
Chinese government to adopt the standards of international IP protection mandated by
TRIPS". Id.
239. See generally SELL, supra note 6, at 1-3 for a discussion of United States
involvement and leadership in IP law development.
240. See supra Part IV.
241. See supra Part V.B.
242. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 7.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See generally id. at 20-30 for a discussion of how Brazil's "IP opportunism" may
pose a threat to U.S. property rights.
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A. History and Culture ofBrazil
Brazilians focus on community and maintaining a high degree of
social involvement.2 46 Brazil is rich with natural resources and
opportunities for economic growth.24 7 Yet the country is saddled with
the after-effects of hundreds of years of a plantation society.248  As a
result, there is a massive gap between the rich and the poor in an
otherwise wealthy country. 24 9  Consequently, experts state that Brazil
lacks the "core human capital, namely, education, and a market-friendly
enabling environment that incorporates strong recognition and protection
of exclusive intellectual property rights."250 Additionally, the
government suffers from systematic corruption, making domestic goals,
such as affordable national healthcare, difficult to accomplish. 2 51 In the
midst of this political environment, Brazil has enacted laws that protect
unfair competition.2 52
B. Brazil Trade-Secret Law
Brazil, and more generally Latin America, does not have a history
of trade-secret law.253 However, Latin American countries have
basically protected the same information that trade-secret laws of other
countries protected with its prevention of dishonest commercial practices
or unfair-competition laws.2 54 In 1996 Brazil overhauled its intellectual-
property laws, placing trade-secret protection formally under the rubric
of "unfair competition."255
Brazilian intellectual property laW2 56 under the unfair competition
provisions in Article 195 of the "Lei de Propriedade Industrial" 257
246. See id.
247. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 4-5.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id
252. See Brazilian IP Law (Law # 9,279/96) cited in 5" International Judges
Conference on Intellectual Property Law, Brazilian Chapter, 2009, available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&ContentlD=22046 [hereinafter International Judges Conference].
253. See Pedro A. Padilla Torres, An Overview of International Trade Secret
Protection, http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxipl4.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Torres].
254. Id.
255. See Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets Home Page, http://tradesecretshomepage.com/
intern.html (last visited Feb. 4 2010) [hereinafter Trade Secrets Home Page].
256. See International Judges Conference, supra note 252.
257. See Torres, supra note 253.
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protects trade secrets.2 58 Article 195 establishes as statutory federal
felonies the following acts:2 59
1. The unauthorized disclosure, exploitation or use of confidential
knowledge, information or data usable in the industry, in commerce
or in the providing of services (except that which is public knowledge
or which is obvious to a person skilled in the art) to which the person
had access by means of a contractual or employment relationship,
even after termination of the contract.
2. The unauthorized disclosure, exploitation or use of the results of
tests or other undisclosed data, the elaboration of which involved
considerable effort and which has been presented to government
entities as a condition for obtaining marketing approvals. This does
not apply when disclosure is necessary to protect the public. 260
Relief under Brazil trade-secret and unfair-competition law broadly
mirrors that of the United States and China.26' Compensatory and
punitive damages, and injunctions are all available remedies.262 The
statutory federal felonies listed above are punishable by detention of
263three months to one year, or a fine. However, Brazilian law does not
define "confidential knowledge," making it difficult for the judicial
system to determine the information to be protected by the law.264
Conversely, a lawsuit can be filed prior to and to prevent the
disclosure of trade secrets. 265 A preventative lawsuit may be necessary
when entities must submit trade secrets to a government agency for
government authorization. 26 6 For example, the submission of marking
approval for a pharmaceutical product requires filing with the
government agency; a preventative suit would bar other entities or
applicants of generics from accessing the filed secret. 26 7
While this broad overview reflects the commonalities of United
States, Chinese, and Brazilian treatment of trade secrets, Brazil has
recently challenged its own degree of protection afforded to intellectual
258. See International Judges Conference, supra note 252.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Trade Secrets Home Page, supra note 255.
262. Id.
263. See International Judges Conference, supra note 252.
264. See Torres, supra note 253.
265. See International Judges Conference, supra note 252.
266. Id.
267. Id Describing Lawsuit # 2008.34.00.016643-4, where a preliminary injunction
was granted ordering the government agency not to grant marketing approvals to non-
authorized third parties by using plaintiffs trade secrets, or by violating plaintiffs trade
secrets statutory rights. The injunction was later upheld. Id.
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property in the country.268 Brazil now presents an example of an
alternative method of conceptualizing intellectual property that could
have a big impact on international trade.269
C. New Global Framework Advanced by Brazil
Brazil has defined itself as a developing country and has been
promoting a controversial global framework that calls for open access of
knowledge and technology for developing countries. 2 70 This framework
is grounded in an "expanded notion" of sustainable development that
challenges strong intellectual-property rights by favoring public or
communal rights over private-property ownership. 27 1 The framework is
fairly simple, requiring a continuous flow of any new science and
technology to be transferred to self-defined developing countries at
concession-rate prices. 2 7 2  While Brazil and its growing number of
supporters in this movement maintain that this model will enable
developing countries to "liberate themselves from endemic poverty and
disease so that they may ultimately achieve economic and social parity
with the developed world," others feel that this model actually hinders
such countries' prospects for scientific, technological, economic and
social advancement. 2 73
Brazil has advocated a critical reading of TRIPS that would create a
greater balance between intellectual-property protection and public-
health objectives.274  Brazil has influenced the World Health
Organization ("WHO") to openly encourage a flexible reading of TRIPS
that would make public health concerns paramount. 2 75 In 2003, the
WHO World Health Assembly ("WHA") issued a resolution advising
developing countries to structure legislation to take advantage of this
flexible reading.2 76 In 2006, the WHO proposed an "alternative
simplified system for protection of intellectual property."2 77 The system
would allow for royalty-free copying of patents if necessary for public-
health reasons.278 The system proposes that research and development,
one of the largest driving costs factors of medicine, would then be
268. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 4-9.
269. Id
270. Id
271. Id.
272. Id at 8-9 (referring to these prices as "essentially free").
273. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 10-11.
274. Id. at 36.
275. Id. at 38-39.
276. Id. at 39.
277. Id. at 42.
278. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 43.
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financed in other ways, such as taxes or government subsidies. 27 9 Again,
intellectual-property scholars seem divided on what such a plan would do
to innovation, affordability and access.280
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF EACH MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES, CHINA
AND BRAZIL
A. Trade Secrets and the Medical Industry
Protecting valuable medical technology and data as trade secrets is
becoming more prevalent across the globe.281 Companies are turning to
trade-secret protection prior to or instead of seeking patent protection.282
In general, the following are examples of information of particular
interest to those in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical
device fields that can potentially qualify for protection as trade
secrets: NCEs (new chemical entities); chemical formulations;
testing or manufacturing processes and methods; new therapeutic
candidates; methods of treatment for which patent applications have
not published, patents have not issued or FDA approval has not been
sought; employee know-how; and highly sensitive and competitively
useful business and financial information. The following are
examples of information that generally cannot qualify for protection
as trade secrets: general knowledge; skills and abilities necessary to
perform a job; publicly available information or information that is
not sufficiently kept secret; information that is a result of reverse
engineering; and information obtained by independent invention.283
The above list reflects the wide range of medically related
intellectual property that can be protected though appropriate efforts at
secrecy as defined by the applicable trade-secret law.2 84 Trade-secret
protection is vital to the medical industry because often raw materials,
research, and production occur at different places in the world, even for a
single product or company.285 Additionally, trade-secret protection
garners benefits discussed previously such as a virtual monopoly on the
279. Id.
280. Id. at 39-44.
281. See Gibbons and Vogel, supra note 45, at 262. "The importance of properly
protecting intellectual property assets as trade secrets either in lieu of or prior to seeking
patent protection is garnering the attention and support of audiences beyond in-house and
outside counsel in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and medical devices." Id.
2 8 2. Id.
283. Id. at 265 (citing Roger M. Milgram, Milgram on Trade Secrets B 1.09 at 1-505-
1-647 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)).
284. Id.
285. Id.
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information.286 Finally, trade secret may be the best and only source of
protection for medical-testing data and research and development, which
are both crucial to the production of new medicines as well as expensive
and time consuming.2 87
B. Consequences of the Current Systems
The economics of research and development costs is quite
influential to the debate over access and affordability.28 8 The proposed
Brazilian model operates on the assumption that private intellectual-
property rights are not necessary for innovation.289 However, that
assumption fails to consider the high costs of research and
development. 2 90 Companies invest their resources to develop medicine
knowing that they will be reimbursed for that investment.2 91 The Brazil-
model response that taxes or the government could repay that investment
is faulty as well.292 Government funding would raise the costs of
medicines for everyone, since the cost to develop them is so high.2 9 3 If
the costs are spread out evenly, there will still be many people who are
unable afford the medicine, possibly even more so.294
Opening access to pharmaceutical data and intelligence may seem
appealing for "developing countries" or those who wish to reach the
same level economically and health-wise 295 as "developed" countries.
However, looking at the history of trade-secret-law development, those
countries that have started with a strong conception of private rights
seem to have benefited greatly in research and development.2 96 Yet,
while the access and diversity of medicine has been greater, it has
become extremely costly and could be a major cause of the healthcare
crisis in the United States.297 Individual countries want the positives
flowing from research-and-development money that follows the
privatization of intellectual property, but not the negatives of high
286. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing that while trade secrets
have their limitations, they still represent highly valuable corporate assets and "are not to
be taken lightly").
287. See Gibbons and Vogel, supra note 45, at 262.
288. See Kamal Saggi, Trade-Related Policy Coherence and Access to Essential
Medicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6 (2007).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Saggi, supra note 288, at 6.
294. Id.
295. See Kogan, supra note 19, at 10-11.
296. See generally SELL, supra note 6, at 60-74 for a discussion of United States
intellectual-property rights from a historical perspective.
297. See Lickeman, supra note 38.
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prices.298 The United States today seems similarly conflicted as
American politicians complain about high prices yet push the United
States model of privatization of medical knowledge on the rest of the
world.29 9 China appears conflicted as well; despite espousing a strong
commitment to intellectual-property rights, China is one of the leading
recipients of misappropriated information. 300  Amidst this conflict,
countries could begin moving in a protectionist direction that actually
stunts development and frustrates trade.
The argument for free trade in relation to providing medical services
is a strong one.3 0 1 The argument is two-fold.302 First, free trade allows
countries to specialize in activities or production that they have a
comparative advantage in vis-a-vis the rest of the world.303 At the same
time, countries can import products that are produced more efficiently by
other counties.304 Second, free trade allows for international "diffusion
of technology," meaning that countries can build upon what has already
been produced or created by other countries, rather than investing similar
time and resources to the same end.30 s Basically, countries are not forced
to "reinvent the wheel."30 6 These same principles are equally applicable
in the relationship between trade and health.307 If countries can work
together, they can build previously attained knowledge and efficiently
specialize production of medicine and testing data. Yet, the failing of
TRIPS and current domestic enforcement schemes is the misconception
that free trade requires homogenization. 308
This Comment argues that global uniformity is not required for free
trade and exchange of ideas. A more appropriate goal of trade-secret law
is effective global protection and understanding. Countries must
individually come to terms with the kind of conception that they have for
property and what that means for trading, distributing or manufacturing
in the international market. Countries must have a strong identity of
what form of intellectual-property protection they value and what they
are willing to enforce. If countries can make that assessment and feel
that TRIPS is not the most effective scheme for their country, they
298. See CHRISTOPHER HARRISON, THE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRICING OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 4 (2004).
299. Id.
300. See Halligan, supra note 10, at 119.
301. See Saggi, supra note 288, at 8.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Saggi, supra note 288, at 8.
307. Id.
308. See SELL, supra note 6, at 1-2.
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should vocalize this. What is most detrimental to the international-
intellectual property scheme is enacting laws that look like the United
States' with no intention of enforcing them but rather an intention to
"benefit" from trading with TRIPS signatories. Countries must ally
themselves to find a workable solution that promotes sharing of
information without the risk of its being unlawfully misappropriated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States, Chinese, and Brazilian systems for the protection
of trade secrets have distinct similarities and differences. While all three
seem to focus on the protection of trade secrets to prevent unfair
competition, they have distinguishing bases for their legal structures and
enforcement. The concept behind TRIPS was to emphasize homogeneity
and minimize the differences between signatory countries with respect to
intellectual-property rights in the hopes of advancing global free trade. 309
However, since TRIPS mandates domestic legal structures and
enforcement, homogeneity will be lacking, because each state has
differing standards. Moreover, domestic or internal conflicts between
legal structures further complicate opportunities for consistent
application of trade-secret law. Even intellectual-property scholars in the
United States, the country considered as the leading source intellectual-
property development and jurisprudence, are dissatisfied with the current
state of United States trade-secret law. 310 The effectiveness of TRIPS is
thus called into question by its own enforcement scheme.
Misappropriation occurs all the time. With increasing globalization
and value placed on intangible work protectable through trade secret,
effective standards are sorely needed. However, the solution is not a
uniform standard produced by those with the most political and
economic clout and forced on those with comparatively less influence.
Countries need to assess what is best for the health and safety of their
own people while remaining true to their values that are consequently
actually supportable and enforceable. As long as there is candor between
nations there can be differing standards, and countries can choose how to
trade with others in a way that achieves effective product sharing while
not compromising their people's intellectual property. With the amount
of money lost through the misappropriation of trade secrets, countries
could instead afford to provide and develop more medicine. Ironically,
in the end countries must be open and honest to create a workable
solution to the problem of trade-secret theft.
309. See Arewa, supra note 32, at 156-58.
310. See Jorda, supra note 10, at 11.
808 [Vol. 29:4
